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Assessing the Probability of Patients Reoffending After 
Discharge from Secure Forensic Mental Health Services 
An Inductive Prevention Paradox 
 
Bob Heyman, Paul Godin, Lisa Reynolds and Jacqueline 
P. Davies, 
 
Abstract 
 
Citizens of developed societies are deeply troubled by those who commit 
‘irrational’ crimes against the person. Reoffending after discharge from secure 
incarceration for such transgressions triggers particularly intense angst which is 
amplified by media and political scrutiny. However, forensic mental health service 
providers who have to make critical discharge decisions are required to predict 
the future behaviour of patients living in an environment designed to prevent 
reoffending, precisely the risk which needs to be assessed. It will be argued that 
the ‘inductive prevention paradox’ arises because prophylactic measures erase 
evidence about what might happen if such measures were to be lifted. The paper 
will explore this problem in relation to data drawn from two qualitative studies 
undertaken in UK medium secure units, one providing forensic mental health, 
and the other forensic learning disability services. The data analysis will focus on 
how patients and staff respond to the inductive prevention paradox with respect 
to a highly sensitive issue. The wider applicability of this framework to health risk 
management will be considered in the Discussion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mulvey had put on a penitent face and given a series of 
small humble nods. He knew the Governor and the 
Visiting Committee were watching from the gallery and 
he wanted to make an enduring impression. (O’Connor, 
2006, p. 196) 
 
Mulvey, the fictional nineteenth century prisoner mentioned in the opening 
citation, establishes trustee status in order to engineer his escape from a harsh 
19th century Benthamite prison, brutally murdering a guard in the process. The 
present paper will explore an analogous issue to that raised in the novel quoted 
above, that of assessing the risk of  serious reoffending by patients released from 
secure forensic mental health services. It will be argued that staff charged with 
managing this risk face the ‘inductive prevention paradox’i (Heyman et al., 2010, 
p. 103-104). The paradox arises when prophylaxis, in this case through 
confinement within secure accommodation, cuts off evidence about what might 
happen if such measures were withdrawn. The probability of a patient 
reoffending in the outside world has to be estimated from observations made in 
an environment designed precisely to prevent such events from occurring.   
 
Although the paper focuses on the specific context of risk management in 
medium and low secure forensic mental health services, the inductive prevention 
paradox arises whenever prophylactic measures are implemented within a risk or 
non-risk interpretive framework. If the Aztecs did carry out human sacrifices in 
order to appease the Sun God (Meyer, Sherman and Deeds, 2003), they would 
have been trapped by the same paradox. From their perspective, the sun rising 
was a contingency (Heyman, 2012) which might or might not occur, depending 
on divine decision-making. The implementation of human sacrifices would have 
prevented the Aztecs from observing what would have happened in their 
absence. Similarly, the question of whether a detained forensic mental health 
service user would reoffend if released cannot be definitively answered through 
direct observation except by accepting this risk.  
 
The wider implications of the inductive prevention paradox will be touched on in 
the Discussion. The data analysis presented in the Findings section will be 
concerned with discharge of offenders from secure mental health services as an 
example of the inductive prevention paradox, with particular reference to how 
staff and patients responded to this issue. The remainder of the Introduction will 
address three relevant background issues: firstly, the societal attitudes which 
render re-offending by discharged offenders from mental health services as 
unacceptable risk;  secondly, the UK history of medium/low-secure forensic 
mental health services as a response to the inductive prevention paradox seen to 
arise from the structure of more remote high security institutions; and, finally, 
attempts to ‘beat the trap’ arising from the inductive prevention paradox through 
the use of psychometric actuarial methods. It will be argued that neither moving 
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closed institutions closer to ‘the community’ nor resorting to psychometrics offers 
a plausible way out of this paradox. However, staff who have to take decisions 
despite such epistemological limitations face public ignominy if a recently 
discharged patient reoffends. This analysis sets the scene for considering how 
staff and patients attempt to manage this conundrum.  
 
Societal attitudes to the risk of reoffending by forensic mental health 
patients 
 
Risk management for individuals who commit serious offences against the 
person attracts strong media and political attention in the UK and elsewhere 
despite the rarity of such crimes. Concern becomes especially heated when the 
offence is perceived as ‘dirty’, as in the case of sexual assault, particularly on 
children, or as driven by an ‘irrational’ motive, i.e. a belief system which the 
prevailing culture views as delusory. In contrast, more probable causes of death 
and injury, for example those caused by traffic accidents, and even ‘rational’ 
offences against the person such as assaults inflicted during bank robberies, 
attract much less societal angst. Douglas (1966/2002) explained the vehemence 
of the former reaction as a response to social structural weaknesses such as 
unclear internal lines or external boundaries. She argued that ‘primitive’ cultures, 
i.e. small-scale traditional societies which have not developed a high level of role 
differentiation, use belief systems invoking pollution and taboo to buttress the 
weak points of their relatively fragile social order. She also maintained that 
societies with more complex and robust organisation may employ similar devices 
when a challenge is sufficiently powerful to threaten their stronger social 
structure.  
 
The release of offenders who have committed irrational or dirty crimes and 
subsequently reoffend exponentially intensifies the already powerful threat to the 
social order arising from the identification of irrational and therefore unpredictable 
assaults. The perpetrator has not only exposed the dangerously erratic nature of 
human behaviour. In addition, society has registered such disturbing 
transgressions, but has failed to prevent them from reoccurring. The present 
paper is not primarily concerned with explaining societal attitudes to ‘irrational’ or 
‘dirty’ offences per se, but rather with the implications of their intense 
unacceptability for risk assessment and management. The separation of the 
mentally disordered offender from modern society is now accounted for in terms 
of a utilitarian risk management framework even though powerful resonances of 
cultural pollution remain. At the same time, the difficulty of predicting individual 
behaviour make avoidance of re-offending difficult or impossible to achieve.  
 
A brief history of UK medium secure forensic mental health services 
 
Ironically, UK medium-secure forensic mental health units (MSUs) were originally 
conceived of with just the issue of realistic assessment in mind. In the 
terminology developed above, the main aim underpinning the design of MSUs 
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was tackling the inductive prevention paradox. The idea originated in the work of 
The Butler Committee (Home Office and Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1975). Their report reviewed the discharge of mentally disordered 
offenders in the aftermath of the notorious case of Graham Young who had been 
confined to a remotely located high security special hospital after poisoning 
members of his family. Young was released despite having overtly developed his 
poisoning skills during his hospital stay, borrowing many library books on this 
topic. He subsequently poisoned a number of work colleagues, causing media 
uproar. Butler concluded that the system might fail to identify a service user’s 
propensity to reoffend in the remote, esoteric environments of special hospitals.  
 
At the time when the Butler Report was published, in 1975, risk assessment was 
a new and relatively unused procedure (Tidmarsh, 1992). In terms of the risk 
social science which emerged subsequently, it can be argued that the 
organisation of high secure units generated selective perception to the point of 
risk blindness, with tragic but also blackly comic consequences, epitomised by 
the Graham Young case. Despite the report’s recommendations being widely 
publicised, only a few MSUs were opened in the 1970s and 1980s. After another 
national UK report offering a similar analysis had been published (Reed, 1992), 
MSUs began to be established on a large-scale, with their number increasing to 
40 across the UK. Reed presented the benefits of MSUs in terms of them 
providing a half-way house between the high-security hospital and the 
community where service users could be observed and assessed in a more 
appropriate setting without putting the public at risk. Hence, one of the aims 
behind the expansion of MSUs in the 1990s was to provide a more revealing 
environment for risk assessment in relation to the communities to which service 
users would eventually return. Nurses’ negative stereotyping and therapeutic 
pessimism about patients have been associated with high/medium/low security 
level (Mason et al., 2010). However, as will be documented in the Findings 
section, staff charged with critical decision-making about discharge may not 
share the view that the probability of a patient reoffending can be validly 
assessed within the environments of medium and low security units.  
 
In the period since the establishment of MSUs, isolated cases of serious 
reoffending by recently discharged patients have inevitably occurred. A number 
of UK formal inquiries conducted retrospectively have explained reoffending in 
terms of culpable service failures of communication and risk assessment. For 
instance, an inquiry into a killing perpetrated by a patient, John Barrett, one day 
after release from a medium secure unit (South West London Strategic Health 
Authority, 2006) criticised forensic mental health service providers for becoming 
too sympathetic to risky patients. As illustrated below, patients and staff who 
participated in the present research made a similar point when they argued that 
compliant patients could progress quickly through the system to discharge simply 
because they did not cause immediate problems. However, consideration of the 
information available to service providers challenges the assumption 
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underpinning the 2006 inquiry report that patient reoffending can be 
unproblematically predicted providing that staff try hard enough. 
 
It might be suggested that this tragedy would not have occurred if it had not 
been for a single decision, to allow John Barrett out on leave from the 
medium secure psychiatric unit to which he had been readmitted on the day 
before he killed Denis Finnegan … Too much confidence was placed in 
clinical judgements unsupported by evidence and rigorous analysis. (South 
West London Strategic Health Authority, 2006, p.9) 
 
Once it is assumed that service-providers possess the capacity to accurately 
predict whether individuals will reoffend, it follows that their apparent failure to do 
so must arise from individual or organisational inadequacies deserving of 
censure. This interpretive framework thus transforms probability assessment into 
a moral issue. However, as well as discounting the inductive prevention paradox, 
such a perspective ignores the key limitation of probabilistic reasoning which, 
even if it can be based on induction from an adequate set of observations, is 
predicated on the assumption that predictive errors are bound to occur. The 
mindset documented above elides the (attempted) accurate calibration of 
probabilities with perfect prognostication. Staff thereby face a double shortfall 
with respect to meeting societal expectations based on the implicit assumtions 
that the chance of an individual reoffending can be measured, and that this 
metric somehow enables perfect prediction. 
 
Confined to an institution where their riskiness is continually assessed, patients 
may react to being placed under constant observation. They may seek to please 
their clinicians in the hope of gaining more autonomy by reducing their assessed 
riskiness. Conversely, patients may ‘fake bad’, attempting to increase their official 
riskiness in order to invoke a therapeutic response, maintain self-esteem or 
postpone feared discharge, a phenomenon which insiders sometimes depict as 
‘gate fever’. In turn, clinicians may attempt to deceive in the hope of seeing 
through the camouflage of self-presentation in order to uncover a presumed 
psychological reality which will allow the risk of reoffending to be accurately 
assessed.  
 
Service providers and users who live with this situation are likely to appreciate 
the problem arising from the inductive prevention paradox, an awareness 
documented in the Findings section. The following sub-section offers an analysis 
of attempts to predict an individual’s probability of reoffending by means of formal 
risk assessment ‘instruments’. Faith in the value of formal risk assessments has 
waned in recent years. Nevertheless, critical analysis of their underpinning 
epistemology can offer insights into the limitations of probabilistic inference in this 
context, a frame which can be obscured by pragmatic considerations and the 
routinisation of risk assessment procedures as ‘tools’. 
 
Risk assessment ‘tools’ 
 6 
 
The process of discharge decision-making for forensic mental health service-
users is organised around case conferences and the use of risk assessment 
inventories, often called ‘tools’ by health service insiders, although 
recommendations must, in most cases, be externally ratified. The routinisation of 
tool usage, a core feature of UK National Health Service culture, tends to conceal 
their shaky epistemological foundations (Webb, 2012). They contain sets of items 
on which patients are rated, generating summative scores designed to indicate a 
patient’s probability of reoffending after discharge.ii Analysis of their limitations 
sheds light on the predictive difficulties arising from the inductive prevention 
paradox. 
 
Such tools can be divided into three types (Gray et al., 2004). Actuarial measures 
are based on easily encoded biographical information covering offending history 
and demographic factors inductively associated with the probability of reoffending 
(or, more accurately, the probability of being caught and convicted for 
reoffending). An example is the Offender Group Reconviction Scale [OGRS] 
(Copias and Marshall, 1998). A second type of risk assessment tool such as the 
Psychological Checklist, Screening Version [PCL-SV] (Hart, Cox and Hare, 1995) 
focuses on mental states presumed to give rise offending. Thirdly, risk 
assessment inventories, most popularly the Historical, Clinical and Risk 
Management Scales [HCR-20] (Webster, et al., 1997), itemised in Table One 
below, assess an eclectic mix of biographical, psychological and environmental 
risk factors.  
 
Insert Table One here 
 
Gray et al. (2004) concluded that actuarial instruments based on easily coded 
socio-demographic and offending history information predict reoffending risk 
fairly accurately. Follow-up research indicated that about 75% of discharged 
forensic mental health service users were reconvicted for major or minor 
offences in the higher risk group over a three year periodiii, compared with 17% in 
the lower risk group. Unfortunately, less accuracy was obtained for (less 
frequent) major offences, the issue actually of  concern, than for minor ones.  
 
The HCR-20 is intended as an aid to holistic risk assessment rather than as a 
numerical decision-tool. Nevertheless, scores will influence patients’ fates. Gray 
et al. (2004) concluded that the historical and risk management scales of the 
HCR-20 offer moderate predictive accuracy, whilst this and other clinical scales 
have virtually no prognostic power. Gray et al. (2007) also found that the latter 
predict reoffending more accurately for patients with learning disabilities than for 
those with mental disorders. This difference might be associated with whether 
patients are capable of presenting themselves strategically in order to manage 
perceptions of their riskiness. The issue of informational manoeuvring will be 
picked up in the Findings section.  
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The pattern of findings outlined above demonstrates a complete divergence 
between the probabilistic predictive value of scale elements  and their usefulness 
for risk management purposes. Half of the items reference unalterable historical 
factorsiv. Patients who wish to reduce their measured riskiness (i.e. assessed 
probability of reoffending) need to work extra-hard to compensate for a poor 
score on this largest sub-scale. The distinction between the HCR-20 clinical and 
risk management scales is not conceptually clear (see Table One). But the 
former appears to cover mostly the personal factors which MSUs and other 
mental health services are primarily oriented towards dealing with, whilst the 
latter primarily addresses the environment which patients will return to. As with 
historical factors, the patient has hardly any control over the living conditions 
which they will be sent back tov. Staff can do little to influence these risk factors 
on account of organisational fissures between MSUs and community services 
(Davies et al., 2006). Moreover, their perceived riskiness can itself impede 
community integration for discharged forensic mental health service users 
(Coffey, 2012). 
 
The predictive power of tools designed to measure the probability of forensic 
mental health service users reoffending thus appears to be inversely related to 
their risk management usefulness. The best predictors, derived from recorded 
history, are therapeutically immutable. Moreover, they work better prognostically 
for more frequent minor offences than for the less common major ones which are 
of primary societal concern. The task at hand for forensic mental health services 
charged with the rehabilitation of offenders is to identify those who have acquired 
a lower probability of future offending despite carrying a troubled history and 
having to return to criminogenic environments. The inductive prevention paradox 
makes this task particularly difficult. Consideration of presumed personal risk 
factors such as ‘negative attitude’ in the HCR-20 brings the analysis back to the 
question of how practitioners attempt to assess them in a secure environment. 
The research discussed below aimed to explore service user and provider 
navigation of this risk assessment task, taking into account reactive processes 
such as service user attempts to reduce assessed riskiness and staff efforts to 
see through such self-presentation endeavours. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The qualitative data discussed below were drawn from two studies which 
employed a similar methodology. The studies were undertaken in two UK low to 
medium-secure residential facilities, one catering for offenders with learning 
disabilities (Heyman, Buswell-Griffiths and Taylor, 2002) and the other for those 
with mental health problems (Heyman et al., 2004; Davies  et al., 2008), located 
in NE England and London respectively. A more recent project undertaken in a 
second MSU in London which has combined interviews with ethnographic 
observation generated similar findings but will not be discussed further in this 
paper. Approval from a UK NHS Ethics Committee was obtained for each project. 
These medium/low-secure residential institutions can be viewed as ‘risk 
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escalators’ (Heyman, Buswell-Griffiths and Taylor, 2002; Heyman et al., 2004). 
This organisational form of care is informed by a psycho-logic, not always clearly 
articulated, in which service users are supposed to travel through progressively 
lower levels of security towards discharge as their assessed riskiness is judged 
to decline in response to therapeutic interventions. Patients can also be sent 
back up the risk escalator if their progress is considered to have reversed. This 
stepped approach confronts the inductive prevention paradox at each stage, but 
gives rise to accountability issues mostly at the point when a patient re-enters the 
public realm. 
 
The studies were designed to explore service user and staff perceptions of risk 
assessment and management in relation to the discharge. Additional information 
about the two research sites is provided below. Each study was conducted in two 
stages, with general staff interviews followed by detailed data collection focussed 
on individual patients. The first stage interviews explored general staff 
perceptions of risk management within the hospital and decision-making about 
discharge. Second stage data collection included, as far as possible, two 
interviews with selected patients over a 6-20 month period, an interview with a 
staff member who knew them, and observation of ward rounds and case 
conferences (second study only). Patients were identified through staff and 
drawn from a range of security levels. Their perspectives do not necessarily 
represent those of the patient population, but they offered a wide variety of views 
about residential life and progress towards discharge. Patient interviews lasted 
60-90 minutes, and those with staff about 45 minutes.  
 
A grounded theory approach to design, data collection and analysis was 
adopted, with data collection and analysis undertaken concurrently so that 
subsequent interviews could take up emergent issues. The core category around 
which the research was organised was the operation of risk escalators (Heyman, 
Buswell-Griffiths and Taylor, 2002; Heyman et al., 2004). Within this framework, 
a number of key issues were identified for analysis, including divergent views 
about the nature of ‘the problem’ (Davies et al., 2006), multidisciplinary teamwork 
(Shaw et al., 2007) and probabilistic risk assessment, the focus of the present 
paper. Further details about the two research sites and data collection in each 
are provided below. 
 
The forensic learning disabilities study 
 
Data collection was undertaken during 1999-2000 in an NHS residential facility 
catering for offenders with learning disabilities. This institution offers a range of 
security levels from medium-secure to unlocked houses. It is located in a rural 
area of Northern England, several miles away from the nearest town, spreads 
over a substantial area in its own campus, and has gradually evolved as 
buildings were added. The campus contains a range of architectural styles 
including an ultra-modern MSU sealed off by a visually unobtrusive electronic 
system of electronic locks, family houses formerly in domestic usage, and the old 
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low rise shabby brick buildings common in UK asylums. Senior staff members 
stated that the overall structure with its varied security levels had evolved over 
time, and had not been planned. 
  
In the first of the two study phases, interviews were carried out with 13 staff 
members (two consultant psychiatrists, two clinical psychologists, one forensic 
service manager, three unit managers, three nurses, one social worker and one 
occupational worker). No staff member declined to be interviewed. The second 
study phase involved case studies of 11 patients, nine men and two women, 
selected randomly from units with different levels of security. Patients invited to 
participate received an information sheet, discussed with a nurse, which stressed 
the voluntary and confidential nature of the research. One additional male patient 
opted not to participate in the initial interview, one refused a second interview, 
and one who left the hospital could not be re-interviewed for clinical reasons. The 
above patients, and a nurse involved in the care of each (nine in total), were 
interviewed in a private location on the hospital site. Patients were subsequently 
re-interviewed in order to explore their perceptions about their progress. The time 
gap between first and second interviews averaged eight months, with a range of 
4-11 months. 
 
The forensic mental health study 
 
The second study was modelled on the one outlined above, and was situated in 
a residential facility catering for patients whose offending was considered to 
result from mental health problems. Data collection was undertaken between 
2000 and 2003. This institution, like the one discussed above, offers various 
levels of security from medium-secure. It is located in a deprived inner-city area 
of London, , and has a large proportion of patients and staff from diverse ethnic 
minorities. The pre-planned facility was originally designed to look municipal 
rather than prison-like, in keeping with the ideas put forward in the Butler and 
Reed reports, discussed above. However, during the mid-2000s the facility was 
surrounded by a high mesh fence in response to a media-fuelled scandal 
involving the escape of a patient considered dangerous. A bizarre visual 
combination which reflects oscillating public attitudes towards forensic mental 
health service users was thus created. 
 
In the first stage of data collection, 43 interviews with general managers (2), 
qualified (19) and unqualified (7) nurses, psychologists (3), occupational 
therapists (3), social workers (3) and doctors (6), were carried out. The sample 
included 11 senior managers, with at least one at this level from each profession. 
Senior managers worked across ward-based and community services. Three 
nurse respondents were entirely community-based. Managers and medical staff 
all consented to be interviewed, apart from one consultant doctor who declined 
on account of pressure of work. Front-line staff were recruited through requests 
to volunteer, and were therefore self-selected. Nurses on one ward expressed 
suspicion about the purpose of the project and declined to become involved in 
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the phase one interviews, although one of these nurses agreed to participate in a 
case study.  
 
The second study stage involved intensive case studies with 10 patients 
identified by staff. Data collection included, where possible, two interviews with 
each patient, the second undertaken after 11-20 months, an interview with a staff 
member involved in the individual’s care, and observation of case conferences. 
Four additional identified patients were not included, two because they declined, 
one on account of concerns that participation might interfere with therapy, and 
one because he was judged too dangerous to be interviewed privately. One 
interviewed patient declined consent for a staff member to be interviewed about 
his case, and one staff member refused to participate in case studies. Sixteen 
staff were interviewed, providing staff views for nine of the 10 case studies. Two 
case conferences have been attended and recorded, and five patients have been 
revisited for a progress update. Of the other five patients, four were discharged 
during the study period and one died.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
The analysis will be presented in two sections: firstly discussing staff and patient 
perceptions relating to the inductive prevention paradox; and, secondly, 
considering staff attempts to overcome this problem in relation to patients’ 
attempts to manage their own assessed riskiness. 
 
The inductive prevention paradox and risk assessment 
 
Data analysis suggests that assessment of the probability of patients re-offending 
is pervaded by uncertainty. This uncertainty can be contrasted with the official 
purpose of medium secure units, articulated in the Butler and Reed reports, 
discussed above, of providing  a setting similar to that of the external world in 
which risks can be properly assessed. However, confidence in this mission was 
expressed by one very senior manager. 
 
We should take somebody who has committed an offence while they have 
been unwell - bring them in here and be able to - it could be that it is 
homicide, but bring them in here and treat them, and be able to put them 
back in the community somewhere around eighteen months to two years. 
(General manager, forensic mental health unit) 
 
As illustrated below, staff who worked closer to the care sharp end often 
expressed considerably less confidence that rational decisions about discharge 
risks could be made. This comparison suggests the hypothesis that those who 
occupy role positions close to the top of the organisation may, like report and 
inquiry authors, be more likely to accept the validity of its official mission than 
those lower down the hierarchy who are engaged with risk management in 
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specific cases. One ward manager, discussing patient progress towards 
hopefully safe discharge believed that ‘it’s more luck than anything’. 
 
I think that we’re such a mixture here of people and patients with difficulties. 
We’re now dealing with someone with such an extensive forensic history, 
and such complex needs, that often there’s no clear evidence that things 
have moved forward. (Ward manager, forensic mental health unit) 
 
The same respondent contrasted the complexity of the processes giving rise to 
reoffending with the simplification embedded in standardised operational 
procedures. 
 
If someone’s worked well within the Home Office [requirements], and had 
their 12 community trips, and everything has gone according to Home Office 
plan, but there’s still huge anxieties. Because the traits of the personality 
were, are, still in place, then the doctor will, may well, the team will turn 
round and say, you know, ‘He can go to low secure’ … But he’d done 
everything by the book ... If he has done everything by the book then he will 
be discharged. (Ward manager, forensic mental health unit) 
 
This analysis suggests that the forensic health care system responds to the 
inductive prevention paradox by proceduralising risks which cannot be otherwise 
assessed. Patients who comply, enabling the appropriate boxes to be ticked, are 
deemed safe enough for discharge. Such a critique points to a gap between 
official riskiness assessment and the unknown probability of reoffending. The 
respondent further argues that uncertainty  is mitigated, at least for those making 
the decision to move a patient down the risk escalator, by the transfer of risk 
ownershipvi (Heyman et al., 2010, pp. 33-34) to others. 
 
 They would transfer responsibility to going back into the community and to 
another RMO [responsible medical officer] which, with this particular chap’s 
history, [would mean] a huge chance he will offend again. (Ward manager, 
forensic mental health unit)   
 
As the next quotation suggests, one of the strongest demand characteristics 
(Orne, 1962) of the forensic mental health care environment is for patient 
compliance. 
 
Patients get worn down really, not really being cared for. But you’re [patients 
are] beating your head against the wall so many times, so you just accept 
what’s going on. It’s not really that you become all that better. You’ve just 
accepted what’s going on … I think it’s just a case of getting used to the 
environment, or the rules and regulations. (Charge nurse, forensic mental 
health unit) 
 
Most patients learnt, sooner or later, to go along with what was required of them.  
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Well, I suppose I played the game the right way, you know … That’s to keep 
quiet and wait, you know, to get better. (Forensic mental health service 
user) 
 
This patient had become stuck in the system until a nurse ‘frankly’ spelt out what 
was required.  
 
The nurse told us quite frankly that this [compliance] is the gateway, the 
doorway to freedom, you know … And I appreciated that, you know. 
(Forensic mental health service user) 
 
De facto operational reliance on inducing conformity as a means of attempting to 
reduce riskiness raises two linked issues. Firstly, patients may be discharged 
because they have learnt to meet the demand characteristics of the medium 
secure situation. Secondly, patients who pose little risk may become trapped in 
the system because they cannot bring themselves to conform. The patient 
quoted below believed that sex offenders could ‘run’ through the system even 
though their underlying riskiness was not tackled. 
 
Patient: What makes me mad about this place, right, is the fact that, like I 
say, people running through the system and all that, right … And then 
you've got, like, on a Saturday, they go down to [local town] by themselves. 
And owt could happen. Anything's [i.e. children] around on Saturday. 
(Forensic learning disabilities service user) 
 
Qualitative research cannot demonstrate the extent to which compliance speeds 
up release. Nevertheless, this example does illustrate a concern about the 
validity of risk assessment comparable to that discussed by the ward manager 
quoted above.  
 
Conversely, patients who do not comply with the demand characteristics of the 
secure unit difficult may find that their progress is blocked, even though the 
relationship between issues arising in this environment and reoffending in the 
outside world is problematic. For example, consultants expressed alarm at the 
behaviour of a one forensic mental health patient  who had taken hair clippers 
around other wards without permission, hoping to earn money as an amateur 
barber. In a community context, this activity might be viewed as commendably 
entrepreneurial or as lovable Cockney (London East End) canniness. In the 
forensic environment it was seen as an indicator of serious riskiness.  
 
A major cause of patient non-compliance was failure in managing expressions of 
anger. The significance of such displays depends on their meaningful context, in 
both everyday life and the forensic environment. The patient quoted below felt 
that a trivial action had been wrongly classified as a riskiness indicator. 
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I walked across to the table, the pool table, tapped on the top of it, and 
she [the nurse] wrote down that I was feeling aggressive, and that, and all 
things like that. And I just thought, ‘Well, one tap on the table’. I thought 
that was entirely wrong. So I said. She discussed it. It came out in the 
ward round that, she wrote that, which was wrong, out of order. (Forensic 
mental health service user) 
 
This patient felt that he had merely been indicating that his right to a turn at the 
pool table was being violated. The expansion ‘and all things like that’ conveys a 
sense that an edifice of risk reasoning was being built on a misreading of a single 
observation about an action which would not register as a riskiness indicator 
elsewhere. By overtly challenging this interpretation, the patient may have further 
harmed his discharge prospects. A propensity for mental health professionals to 
interpret everyday behaviours in terms of pathological labels (Rosenhan, 1973) is 
well-documented, but takes on new forms within a risk assessment framework. 
Patients and staff occupy an enclosed, highly frustrating environment in which 
interpersonal conflict may be expected. In addition, patients may be subjected to 
minute observation designed to determine the probability of them reoffending. 
This combination of close confinement and total risk assessment may obscure 
the issue of primary concern, namely the likelihood of a discharged patient 
harming others. 
 
A final illustrative example of contested risk assessment is of particular interest 
because it illustrates how a patient’s direct statement of an intention to offend 
can be discounted within a medical interpretive framework. 
 
He [patient] said that he wanted to [commit serious offences]. And they still 
let him go because he turned round and said, ‘Well, I made it all up. I just 
wanted to go and see my mum’ … So, you know, as a nursing team, the 
day before, we had sat around just kind of gob-smacked that the consultant 
had said that he could go … I would not escort him. (Health care assistant, 
forensic mental health unit) 
  
This patient’s tactic may have worked because the consultant viewed his 
behaviour as symptomatic of illness, and ‘prescribed’ a home visit. When asked 
why the consultant had agreed to his parole, a decision which the above 
respondent depicted  as ‘complete madness’, she cited the reason given in the 
patient’s medical notes, namely ‘to allay his [patient’s] anxiety’. Outside forensic 
mental health settings, people often make threats, such as ‘I will kill you’ which 
are not intended or taken literally. The forensic context frames such statement as 
potentially threatening. Health professionals are faced with the task of 
differentiating serious statements of intent from merely metaphorical threats. In 
this case, doctors felt that they knew the patient well enough to rule out real risk 
of offending. However, if their judgements prove with hindsight to have been 
incorrect, they might be held to account by judges of responsible risk-taking. 
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Strategies for managing the inductive prevention paradox  
 
Some staff and patients expressed concern about the problematic validity of risk 
assessments, as illustrated above. In general, the data suggest that, not 
surprisingly, staff gave more attention to reducing the risk of released patients 
reoffending than they did to that of detaining patients unnecessarily. Service 
users were mostly concerned about getting released as quickly as possible. 
Staff, therefore, had to try to see through patients’ attempts to disguise their 
riskiness. Three strategies which staff adopted are discussed below: discounting 
good behaviour; mini-trials; and formalised risk assessment.  
 
Discounting good behaviour 
 
Given that patients mostly want to be released as early as possible, they might 
be expected to attempt to act in ways which would reduce their assessed 
riskiness. Staff, in turn, might try to see through such attempts at self-
presentation in order to minimise the risk of released patients reoffending. One 
forensic learning disabilities worker, discussing this issue, said that (male) 
patients would be asked questions designed to test their truthfulness such as 
whether they would look at a woman with large breasts! This approach, an 
informal version of personality test ‘lie scales’, provides an obviously fragile 
method for checking patient veracity. A psychiatrist indicated that staff might 
deliberately withhold revealing the purpose behind an activity involving a patient 
so that it could be used as a test of their underlying riskiness. The ‘star patient’, 
discussed next, was seen as operating a policy designed to reduce his assigned 
riskiness and thereby maximise his prospects of early release. 
 
Every time I stop, ‘Oh I’m fine, I’m alright’. ‘Have you got anything you are 
worried about?’ ‘No.’ … He’s all pleasant. He looks normal ... We know he 
is the ‘star patient’ and everything, but [laughs] we have to watch him, 
[given] what he did before, you know. (Nurse, forensic mental health unit) 
 
The patient’s conduct is seen as too good to be true. This suspicion is framed by 
awareness of the seriousness of his previous offending, illustrating the difficulty 
which patients experienced about compensating for historical risk indicators, as 
discussed above in relation to risk assessment tools. Patients faced with this bind 
perhaps need to adopt a more subtle approach, first ‘faking bad’ so that their 
subsequent conversion to low riskiness might appear more credible! Mulvey, the 
fictitious nineteenth century prisoner described in the opening quotation from Star 
of the Sea adopted just this tactic. 
 
Mini-trials 
 
Testing through mini-trials involves allowing a small temporary increase in 
autonomy in the hope of assessing the probability of future reoffending more 
accurately, whilst hopefully limiting the risk of it actually occurring. Success can 
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be built on progressively, for instance by lengthening parole periods. This 
strategy had been adopted with the ‘star patient’ discussed above. 
 
Nurse: I personally think, when he [‘star patient’] goes out [on parole], that’s 
a big test for him, because he goes out on a Saturday to [large town], and 
[large town] is quite far, and anything can happen then … If something really 
pushed him, he would do something. (Nurse, forensic mental health unit) 
 
Staff described covertly observing a forensic learning disabilities patient who had 
committed offences involving children when he went to a swimming pool in order  
to see if he showed an inappropriate interest in them. The strategy can be 
compared to that traditionally adopted for inductively testing the safety of novel 
foods by eating progressively larger amounts. Its limitations can easily be 
identified. As the above respondent indicates, a risk of immediate disaster is 
inescapably incurred. Conversely, patients might conceal their offending 
proclivity until permanently discharged. 
 
Formalised risk assessment 
 
Tools such as the HCR-20 which are used to assess reoffending risk can also 
take on a symbolic function. This way of ‘managing’ risk assessment is illustrated 
by the following extract derived from observation of a ward round. The consultant 
quoted came in after a lengthy discussion concerning difficulties arising from the 
actions of a female patient, including conflicts about bathing and money matters, 
and accusations directed at male staff. 
 
Consultant: What risk assessment was done. The pink thing? Do we need 
to assign numbers? [Senior house officer reads out numbers from the ward 
round summary.] Make a point of noting risk to others on the ward round 
minutes and notes. We need to be vigilant.  [Moves on to next patient.] 
(Ward round, forensic mental health unit) 
 
The reading out of probability ‘numbers’ combined with an admonition to be 
‘vigilant’ conveys a sense that an authoritative, scientifically rational resolution 
has been achieved, even though it skirts over their problematic meaning.  
 
Measuring patient progress towards a level of riskiness which would justify their 
discharge relies on observing their behaviour. However, many of the issues 
which arise in a secure setting bear little relation to those which would be of 
concern outside and visa versa. The validity of the whole process depends upon 
assuming either that patients are judgemental dopes, or that their self-
presentation strategies can be penetrated. 
 
DISCUSSION 
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It has been argued in this paper that the rationality of risk assessment is 
undermined by the operation of the inductive prevention paradox. Forensic 
mental health service providers are expected to assess the probability of a 
patient harming others in the future after discharge by obtaining observational 
‘evidence’ in a present environment designed to prevent just such events from 
occurring. They are required to answer the question of how, if at all, a patient’s 
riskiness has been changed by long-term incarceration, even though the 
inductive prevention paradox cuts off the supply of ‘evidence and rigorous 
analysis’ (South West London Strategic Health Authority, 2006, p.9) which those 
who conduct retrospective inquiries often assume to be readily available. Their 
role as risk owners puts staff into a trap which they struggle to escape from. They 
lack an inductive evidence base for probability estimation, whilst, at the same 
time understanding that they risk condemnation if a discharged patient seriously 
reoffends. The ultimate source of this bind is the prevailing cultural assumption 
that science, if properly applied, can banish risk. This problematic promise comes 
up against a double limitation: that probabilistic reasoning does not preclude the 
occurrence of adverse events; and that prevention blocks out risk managers’ 
view of the most relevant evidence.  
 
The inductive prevention paradox is particularly likely to trap decision-making in 
an evidence-impoverished virtual bubble when the contingency of concern is 
culturally abhorred, as in the case of ‘mad’ or ‘dirty’ offences against the person. 
However, other more or less emotionally charged examples can easily be 
identified. The most direct comparison is with prisoners attempting to negotiate 
release via parole boards who report similar concerns about risk game-playing to 
those illustrated in the present paper (Muhammad, 1996). Although such 
information games were depicted long ago, the inmates of the asylums  observed 
by Goffman (1961) were not subjected to constant risk assessment as they 
would be today. In the heyday of asylums, staff stripped patients of identities 
which they considered defective. This form of governmentality has been replaced 
by one framed in terms of risk. Patients are sifted through a probabilistic filter 
which is designed to allow only acceptably safe individuals to pass through to the 
world outside.  
 
Anyone who has taken preventative measures faces the question of what 
damage might result from lifting them. Although they can be resumed if 
necessary, their reapplication might not erase irreversible consequences of their 
temporary withdrawal. For example, a frail older person who has decided that 
going out alone is too risky might suffer a serious injury if they tried to test their 
current capabilities. Similarly, a person living with depression might commit 
suicide if they stopped taking medication; and a Crone’s disease sufferer might 
experience uncontrollable flare-ups if they abandoned anti-inflammatory drugs for 
a trial period. As with incarcerated mental health patients, prophylaxis may itself 
change risk conditions in ways which are hard to assess. An older person who 
has confined themselves to their home for a lengthy period might become more 
vulnerable to falls through lack of practice if they do eventually go out. Similarly, 
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the long-term anti-depressant user might experience withdrawal symptoms from 
these addictive substances, or suffer long term psycho-physiological damage. 
Unless they remove protective measures, facing the risk of irreversible damage, 
individuals in these predicaments cannot know whether they are still necessary 
or notvii. 
 
The inductive prevention paradox can be escaped from if proxy measures 
associated with the probability of the outcome of concern, but unaffected by the 
operating preventative measures, could be identified. Unfortunately, the 
prognostic need for such measures does is not matched by their availability. The 
limitations of the ‘tools’ available for risk assessment in a forensic mental health 
context were reviewed in the Introduction. It was noted that the best predictor, 
offending history, adds no predictive value with respect to changes in the 
probability of a patient reoffending; that staff in practice had no sight or control of 
the post-discharge environment, the second-best predictor; and that the 
psychological factors which they did attempt to manipulate offered no prognostic 
valueviii. Lacking from the staff predictive toolbox was any way of observing what 
patients would have done if they had been living in the community during the 
lengthy period in which they had been confined to an institution, during which 
time their presumed propensity to offend might or might not have changed. 
 
The efforts of forensic mental health service providers to compensate for such 
shortcomings were obviously flawed. Their strategies included trying to see 
through patient self-presentations, using suck-it-and-see mini-trials, and relying 
on the illusory precision of numerical risk assessments. Practitioners are entitled 
to ask what on earth they are supposed to do? Four constructive suggestions 
can be drawn from the present analysis. Firstly, societal expectations about the 
potential of risk assessment in this and other domains affected by the inductive 
prevention paradox need to become more realistic, so that a de facto 
retrospective blame culture is replaced by one which allows for positive risk-
taking (Titterton, 2005). Secondly, service users can be actively engaged in an 
open risk assessment process (Langan and Lindow, 2004), rather than being 
deceived in order to try to prevent them from concealing their real riskiness. 
Thirdly, top-down moralising about poor inter-agency and multi-professional 
collaboration should be replaced by serious attempts to analyse the 
organisational reasons why such failures endlessly recur (Shaw et al., 2007). 
Risk systems theory (Japp and Kusche, 2008) provides a useful starting point for 
analysing barriers to collaboration by postulating that organised groups 
unreflectively construct and orient to distinctive risk objects. Finally, serious 
attempts to address the environments which offenders return to (Mullen, 2000; 
Brett et al., 2007; Coffey, 2010) would complement the present focus on 
assessing and reducing personal riskiness. Although currently inhibited by 
organisational and political barriers, attention to the quality of the lives which 
forensic mental health patients will return to offers the most promising means of 
combining controllability with probabilistic predictive purchase.  
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TABLE ONE 
RISK ASSESSMENT DOMAINS COVERED BY THE HCR-20 
 
Historical Clinical  Risk Management 
H1   Previous violence C1  Lack of insight R1 Plans lack feasibility 
H2   Young age at first 
violent incident 
C2  Negative attitude R2 Exposure to 
destabilisers 
H3   Relationship 
instability 
C3  Active symptom of 
major mental illness 
R3 Lack of personal 
support 
H4   Employment 
problems 
C4  Impulsivity R4 Non-compliance with 
remediation attempts 
H5   Substance use 
problems 
C5  Unresponsive to 
treatment 
R5 Stress 
H6   Major mental illness   
H7   Psychopathy   
H8   Early maladjustment   
H9   Personality disorder   
H10 Prior supervision 
failure 
  
 
 
                                            
i
 The ‘inductive prevention paradox’ should be distinguished from the widely discussed 
‘prevention paradox’ (Rose, 1981) which arises from attributing a risk associated with an 
aggregate category such as alcohol consumption to individuals who meet the specified criteria for 
category membership. Both paradoxes are bound up with the limitations of probabilistic thinking. 
But the latter, which could be termed the ‘ecological prevention paradox’, derives from the 
requirement to shift between the aggregate and the individual in order to quantify probabilities 
(Heyman et al., 1998; Hunt, 2003). The inductive prevention paradox results from limitations in 
the observational evidence base itself. 
ii
 Tools direct selective service attention to particular adverse events, thereby carrying implicit 
value judgements. 
iii
 Probabilities can only be quantified in relation to a temporal horizon, in this case three years, 
beyond which adverse events are not taken into account. Practically focused risk managers tend 
to frame time unreflectively. 
iv
 More accurately, the probability of a patient reoffending is related to recorded history. Patients 
can influence their ‘history’ in this sense, for example by concealing previous offending. However, 
once their offending history has been encoded in a patient record, patients are cannot change it, 
unless they can demonstrate their innocence, a very unlikely possibility for those who have 
committed offences against the person. 
v
 Discharged patients may be directed away from localities associated with former offending. 
However, they will thereby also separated from social networks and familiar surroundings, and 
tend to end up in areas of serious socio-economic deprivation which are associated with 
additional problems such as high crime rates and drug problems. 
vi
 The concept of risk ownership originated in corporate governance where it is used to convey a 
top-down model of social order in which a senior manager at board level is made accountable for 
each risk which the organisation is deemed to face. As with risk management, the notion can be 
applied more generally to everyday life. For example, in the forensic mental health sphere, close 
relatives may decline to take back responsibility for a discharged offender (Heyman et al., 2010, 
p. 34). 
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vii
 Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) can provide counterfactual evidence at an aggregate level. 
For instance, patients in the placebo group can be expected to have done as well on average as 
those in the treatment group if they had received an experimental drug. However, this aggregated 
knowledge offers limited predictive accuracy in individual cases, and the methodology of RCTs is 
difficult or impossible to apply with respect to long-term, complex interventions. 
viii
 A parallel debate  has taken place in the criminal justice system, with advocacy of a ‘tool’ for 
assessing reoffending risk, the Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R) challenged by sceptics 
(Gendreau, Goggin and Smith, 2002). 
